We present a theoretical and empirical analysis of stable coexistence among the world's anchor currencies (G3): the dollar, euro and yen. The theoretical model presented in this paper builds on a model of spatial competition and rests on a set of assumptions related to the behavior of central banks, the workings of exchange rate regimes, the geography of money, and international monetary arrangements. We show that stable coexistence in the sense of the pure-strategy equilibrium derived in our model is attainable in the case of two anchor currencies, but not in the case of three. The empirical evidence provides support for the assumptions and conclusions of the model.
Introduction
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system the world of money has been dominated by three anchor currencies (G3): the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, and the euro (formerly the Deutsche mark).
1 With respect to their significance, several major proposals have suggested that the G3 countries enter into a joint target zone that would stabilize their exchange rates around estimated equilibrium levels within specific bands (see Volcker, 1997; McKinnon, 1997; and Williamson, 1998) or constitute a basis for a new international currency (Mundell, 2001 (Mundell, , 2005 . The reasons behind these proposals reflect worries related to global monetary stability (Salvatore, 2007) and global structural imbalances (Salvatore, 2006) . Cohen (1998) analyzed the power of anchor currencies by forging the concept of "authoritative domain", which combines the extent to which an anchor currency facilitates transactions and the territoriality of its use. Authoritative domain thus combines the functional as well as spatial dimensions of an anchor currency into a single concept of use and authority. The size of an anchor currency's authoritative domain grows when additional "satellite" currencies are linked to the anchor currency via an exchange rate regime and form an informal currency area. An anchor currency captures a satellite currency when the latter is tied to the former via some more or less strict exchange rate regime and through this informal currency area the size of an anchor currency's authoritative domain grows. 2 The options for ties between anchor and satellite currencies range from a simple peg to managed float with an anchor currency as a 1 Given the steadily growing importance of the Deutsche mark among the European currencies after World War II, we take the liberty of extending the Deutsche mark to the euro since such a continuity greatly simplifies the empirical part of this paper. There is no other motivation beyond this. 2 "Only a privileged few states with the most widely circulated currencies, such as the U.S. dollar, Europe's new euro (succeeding Germany's Deutsche mark), and the Japanese yen, can realistically aspire to a unilateralist leadership strategy", writes Cohen (2004, p. xv) . In terms of the yen, McKinnon (2000) asserts that central banks in North and Southeast Asia maintain unaltered soft dollar pegs. On the other hand, several studies find a declining influence of the dollar in the region (Kwan, 1996; Aggarwal and Mougue, 1996; Bowman, 2005) . Kearney and Muckley (2005) provide a review of the previous research on the influence of the Japanese yen in Asian foreign exchange markets. Most recently, Kearney and Muckley (2007a) examine the evidence of an emerging yen block in North and Southeast Asia using up to 27 years of weekly data on nine bilateral yen exchange rates. Their results indicate a strong but declining influence of the U.S. dollar. Their findings are consistent with the documented rise in intra-regional trade integration in North and Southeast Asia, and with an emerging yen influence that falls short of a de facto yen block. In a further reassessment, Kearney and Muckley (2007b) document that the yen's influence is rising amongst a subset of the Asian currencies since the early 1990s. Thus, besides the fact that Japan itself intervenes heavily in the dollar from time to time, and that the yen/dollar rate is not a pure float, the above literature supports the fact that the yen qualifies as an anchor currency.
reference currency. 3 Clans in the title of the paper refer to sets containing anchor currency and captured satellite currencies. A currency is not "captured" when a satellite currency follows a pure float.
Why would an anchor currency be interested in extending its authoritative domain in the first place? It is common knowledge that the G3 currencies are vehicle currencies whose function as an exchange medium extends far beyond domestic trade to wider use in international transactions. As a consequence, monetary transactions and their volumes represent a transmission mechanism that provides the central bank of an anchor currency with control over satellite currencies within an informal currency area. The authority is due to the fact that as an exchange rate arrangement becomes more tightly tied to the anchor currency, the central bank of a satellite currency becomes less independent in monetary policy conduct and the origin of its monetary base becomes more foreign. The trade-off for decreased independence is reduced exchange rate volatility and a potential for lower inflation. The reason is because the authority over satellite currencies is not a one-way process. A tie between satellite currencies and an anchor currency greatly reduces volatility within an informal currency area. Reduced volatility, in turn, may promote international trade by further reducing the costs of business activities for economies of both anchor and satellite currencies. 4 In addition, if satellite currency countries tie their currencies to an anchor currency with lower inflation, they are also likely to benefit from reduced inflation.
5
To summarize, central banks of anchor currency countries have practical reasons to be interested in capturing satellite currencies and increasing their authoritative domain, because this allows them to gain greater 3 A comprehensive discussion of a wide range of currency regime changes (actual and potential) around the world is given by Cohen (2004) . In terms of exchange rate arrangements, there has been growing support for abandoning regimes between hard pegs and free floats because of high capital mobility. Such a bipolar view is frequently referred to as a "corner solution" or the "hollowing out of intermediate regimes." It was initially discussed by Eichengreen (1994) ; relevant arguments were further provided by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995 ), Goldstein (1999 ), and Eichengreen and Fisher (2001 . Proponents of the bipolar view argue that pegs or floats are the only regimes compatible with the current degree of market integration and that countries with high capital mobility should discard intermediate regimes in favor of extreme ones. 4 The advantages of a common currency, such as lower transaction costs in trade and less uncertainty about relative prices were recognized already by Mundell (1961) . McKenzie (1999) reviews the impact of exchange rate volatility on international trade. Using the conditional variance approach Kroner and Lastrapes (1993) find a negative effect of volatility on trade for the U.S. and the UK. More recent literature contains pronounced evidence on the negative impact of exchange rate volatility on international trade. Based on a gravity model approach López-Córdova and Meissner (2003) and Dell'Aricia (1999) find evidence that exchange rate volatility has a negative impact on international trade. 5 The importance of low inflation is theoretically grounded as well as empirically documented (see Giavazzi and Giovannini 1989, among others) .
control over satellite currencies, to reduce volatility and hence promote international trade, and to increase price stability. Satellite countries, in turn, import some of these benefits through pegs to the anchor. 6 The model is set up as a two-stage game in which the central banks of the anchor currencies compete for shares of the currency holdings of satellite countries that represent a proxy for the size of the authoritative domain. 7 The preferences of the satellite countries for the policies of the anchor currency's central bank to which they are linked are assumed to be distributed along a line as in the Eaton and Lipsey (1975) model. We show that with some changes in assumptions, the results of the standard spatial competition model continue to hold.
Specifically, we find for a large range of parameters a pure-strategy equilibrium in the case of two anchor currencies, but not in the case of three. 8 This suggests that exchange-6 Such a latent variable may reflect the constraints of a central bank, which we do not consider for the simplicity of our model. 7 The monetary policy of a satellite country is assumed to have a negligible impact. 8 As our model is highly stylized and focuses on long-term behavior, it does not address other aspects of an rate stability is achievable with two anchor currencies but generally not with three anchor currencies. We note that the purpose of the model is not intended to provide a precise explanation of the observed patterns of exchange rate development, but rather to present an illustration of the possible consequences if the number of anchor currencies is reduced from three to two. The empirical part of the paper provides evidence that our assumptions are realistic and that the observed phenomena are consistent with our model's predictions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present and analyze the formal theoretical model. Section 3 describes the data and provides empirical extensions. A brief conclusion follows in Section 4.
Model and Equilibrium Analysis
Cohen (1998) introduced the notion of a currency's "authoritative domain" by combining the functional dimension (transactions) as well as the spatial dimension (territoriality) of money into "a single amalgam of use and authority." The authoritative domain of a foreign anchor currency expands with the number and, more specifically, volume of satellite currencies that are tied via various exchange rate regimes to the anchor currency.
In effect, when the central bank of a satellite currency pegs its currency to an anchor currency, it cedes control over the value of the satellite currency to the anchor foreign currency. Under these circumstances, satellite currencies do not have reason to disappear, though their authoritative domain is greatly eroded. Consequently, transactions and their volumes represent an economic transmission mechanism that gives the central banks of anchor currencies control over satellite currencies because "the currency of a country that has a large share of international output, trade and finance has a natural advantage"
(Jeffrey Frankel as quoted in Cohen, 1998, p. 97) .
Given this reality of the international geography of money, we build a model of spatial competition among the central banks of anchor currencies in a two-stage game setup.
There are n anchor currencies, each attached to one large country (or to a group of countries that form a monetary union Using standard theory, the origin of a monetary base can be inferred from a country's choice of exchange rate regime. If a country favors a floating exchange regime, then the 9 In the real world the importance of the interest rate is accented by the behavior of large institutional investors on the financial markets through the phenomenon known as "carry trade", which is a form of investment strategy among leveraged investors and real money managers. The strategy exploits the forward bias by investing in high-yielding currencies. In a "carry trade", an investor borrows in a low interest rate currency and then takes a long position in a higher interest rate currency betting that the exchange rate will not change so as to offset the interest rate differential. 10 Replacing this interval with an open interval does not change the results. Further, given that our policy variable is assumed to primarily reflect the interest rate, our one-dimensional policy space is better characterized as a line and not, for example, as a circle, as a circular policy space would imply that very high and very low interest rates correspond to the same policy. We address generalizations to a multidimensional policy space below. 11 Baines (2001) documents three trends in the political economy of exchange rate policy in advanced industrialized countries: an unprecedented rise in capital mobility, a favor of floating exchange rates (at least officially) and a need for sound monetary policy, and high levels of central bank independence. These trends result in monetary policy directed at maintaining domestic price stability above all other concerns. In our model we employ price stability as the central bank's objective. 12 In any event, in our stylized model we restrict our attention to the single and arguably dominant motive of price stability. In reality, specific goals vary across central banks but we prefer to keep the model tractable over maximizing its realism. We might not lose much in terms of realism due to our simplification. We define the dependencies of satellite currencies on anchor currencies in the context of arguments given by Reinhardt and Rogoff (2004) . Based on their categorization of de facto (true) exchange regimes, we are able to trace the shares of foreign currency holdings. In this way we can proxy for the anchor currency's authoritative domain more precisely than relying on official exchange regime categorization, which often does not reflect reality. Formally, let C be the amount of domestic currency expressed in terms of foreign anchor currencies to which a domestic currency is linked via a particular exchange rate regime, and i c be the part of C expressed in anchor currency i that corresponds to the weight of i in the currency basket. Clea C c
nvenient notation covers all the possible cases outlined above: 1) when n=0, then C=0 and the satellite currency is floating; 2) when n=1, then the satellite currency is pegged to an anchor currency; and 3) when n>1, then the satellite currency is under a currency basket peg regime. ., and then the satellite countries choose their foreign currency holdings.
Our model resembles the spatial competition model by Eaton and Lipsey (1975) , but differs in three respects. First and most importantly, we introduce the preferences of anchor currencies' central banks over their location in the policy space. Second, as will be seen below, satellite countries do not exclusively choose the anchor currency closest to their own preferred policy, but rather a mix of respective closest currencies on both sides such that the weighted average policy of these currencies corresponds to the preferred policy. Finally, central banks can choose identical policies, in which case the linked 14 The objective function G i is increasing in s i since the connection of satellite currencies to an anchor currency via exchange rate regimes decreases the volatility of bilateral exchange rates in the informal currency area, and hence fosters international trade and reduces the costs of business activities. Since the oices work otivate our own, as well as lend support to our model that, besides other things, describes economic conditions in anchor currency countries differ, not considering the effects of their policy ch on satellite countries' pegs, they have different preferences with respect to their policy. 15 Devereux, Shi, and Xu (2007) countries choose baskets with equal shares in these currencies. 16 We show below that the Consider first the behavior of the satellite countries in the second stage. We assume that they aim to peg to a basket such that the weighted average of the interest rates of the anchor currencies in the basket is as close as possible to their preferred policy l. The underlying reason for this assumption that a satellite country would be interested in having an interest rate close to the mix of anchor currencies in the basket is rooted in interest rate parity theory. Equal interest rates do not constitute a ground for either exchange rate depreciation or appreciation and similar interest rates imply only low pressure on exchange rate adjustments over time. The central bank of a satellite currency country would therefore prefer to peg to an anchor currency (basket) that most closely reflects its preferred policy because this policy would otherwise not be sustainable or frequent exchange rate adjustments would have to be made. For the same reason, a satellite country prefers to include in the basket anchor currencies whose policy choice is closer to their own preferred policy. If a satellite currency country has a choice between two different baskets that have the same weighted average policy, it chooses the basket that minimizes the max luded in the basket.
Given the satellite countries' preferences over the baskets they could peg to, their optimal choice will be a mix of the closest anchor currencies. More precisely, as above let C be the amount of domestic currency expressed in terms of foreign anchor currencies to which a domestic currency is linked via a particular exchange rate regime, and i c be the part of C expressed in anchor currency i that corresponds to th
). Without loss of generality, assume n x x ≤ ≤ ... (and correspondingly if more than 2 x are identical). 17 Below, we will consider subgame-perfect equilibria, where in each subgame following a choice of policies by the anchor currency countries, satellite countries will choose their bes norm t reply, i.e. choose their baskets as above. Thus when we discuss different equilibria below, we will only describe the behavior of the anchor currency countries explicitly.
Let us now turn to the first stage of the game, the anchors' choice of locations in the policy space. Assume for simplicity that C is identical for all satellite countr s and Without loss of generality, this can be achieved by replacing the density of satellite countries f by the density of foreign currency-expressed holdings * f with Note that since the conditions for the equilibria of type (a) and (b) are mutually exclusive, the pure-strategy equilibrium (if it exists) is unique. Hence, in a finitely repeated game the equilibrium play will be repeated and the situation is stable in the sense that the policies of the two anchor currencies are stable over time and satellite countries do not change their exchange rate regimes. In the case of an equilibrium of type (a) the policies will change if, due to external shocks, the preferred policies of the satellite countries shift. They will, however, change in a parallel fashion provided that the shift is not too radical, because the equilibrium policies will stay at the median as long as is an equilibrium. In other words, if there is no pure-strategy equilibrium there is only a mixed-strategy equilibrium and naturally the mixed strategies will (in general) yield different realizations and hence different locations of anchor currencies in each period. Thus we would expect fluctuating policies of the an to f me nsequence, the currency baskets of east so of the satellite countries will also change from period to period. we extended it to a multi-dimensional policy space. However, even if we considered a higher-dimensional policy space, our model would always be a substantial simplification.
Hence, our results can only be an illu mber of anchor currencies. Therefore, we prefer to adhere to the comparatively simple one-dimensional version of the model.
Our results also give insight into the notion of a currency's authoritative do e an equilibrium strongly depends on the number of com
Quantitative Evidence and Statistical Inference
The model designed in the previous section cannot be directly estim nometric techniques. To illustrate its link to real economy phenomena we provide some quantitative evidence as well as statistical inference below.
We collected data on the exchange rates of domestic currencies with respect to the U.S. dollar, the Deutsche mark/ECU/euro, 22 and the Japanese yen (the anchor 21 Our results indicating a stable coexistence with two anchor currencies are also broadly in line with numerous theoretical models of foreign exchange trading that use a two-currency framework (see Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui, 1993 and Zhou, 1997 among others) . Moreover, the non-existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies in the case of three currencies corresponds to the results of Rey (2001) , where the three-country model of the world economy has three partial and three total equilibria, where each currency can be the vehicle. 22 ECU denotes European currency unit, a composite currency established with the inception of the European Monetary System. currencies). Figure 1 shows cases that are of interest: when n=0, then C=0 and the satellite currency is floating; when n=1, then the satellite currency is pegged to an anchor currency; and when n>1, then the satellite currency is under a currency basket peg regime. If a country favors, for instance, a currency basket peg, then the weights of currencies in a basket are used to determine 23 The countries in our data sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia. 24 Because of this, we do not incorporate into our sample a number of satellite countries. 25 Due to data inconsistencies we do not cover the 1950s in our analysis. This exclusion does not constitute a deficiency since the Bretton Woods System was firmly in place at that time and none of the repositioning implied by our model could take place. 26 Technically, C should also include the foreign exchange reserves of the central banks of satellite currencies held in anchor currencies. However, since those foreign exchange reserves consist of currencies already issued by the central banks of anchor currencies, we cannot consider them. Aside from this, the structure of foreign exchange reserves held usually reflects the weights of the anchor currencies within the exchange rate regime. In particular, we specify the amounts of satellite currencies linked to a particular anchor currency via an exchange rate regime, and express these amounts in terms of the specific anchor currency. The sum of the above amounts along with the sum of the anchor currency itself form a reasonable proxy for the extent of an anchor currency's authoritative domain, despite the fact that "the data simply do not exist to accurately report all cross-border use of currencies, let alone 98, p. 24) accurately notes. 27 We trust that our construction is a realistic way to operationalize the concept of authoritative domain. candidates that would firmly establish a situation of two anchor curre 27 We acknowledge that there are other dimensions to an international currency than monetary mass. Its use in invoicing and the clearing of international payments are the two pointed out by Dowd and Greenaway (1993) . Since a central bank does not control these two alternative measures, they are not used here as they are not directly compatible with our model. However, based on the quantitative theory of money one should expect a high degree of correlation among the three mentioned measures as more transactions require more money. 28 The share of monetary aggregate of the currencies not linked to any anchor currency is negligible and is not pictured in the Figure 1 .
2.
rrencies with relatively close pre minimum, median and max um. Then we calculated the inter-peri interest rate in each category between two consecutive periods t and t-1 as r Finally, the post-1979 period represents a situation in which, in the framework of our model, unquestionably n > 2 and no pure-strategy equilibrium exists. Figure 3 shows the dynamics of the key short-term interest rates at which central banks of the anchor currencies lend to commercial banks (discount rates). The figure also captures all the changes in interest rates that central banks performed during the period under research. In this respect, the plotted changes in interest rates reflect the first stage of our model. The plots allow us to detect changes in the repositioning of the central banks of anchor currencies in one-dimensional space. Short-term interest rates vary extensively, but the differences among the short-term rates are relatively small. 29 We observe broad medium-term parallel movements which are attributable to changes in global economic conditions. Short-term movements are frequently not parallel, which is consistent with our model's prediction for three anchor cu ferred policies. Short-term non-parallel policy changes are consistent with repositioning in the absence of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
In our model introduced in Section 2 we assume that the central bank of an anchor currency uses the interest rate as a major factor forming the latent (unknown) policy instrument that is used for positioning purposes within the one-dimensional space. We provide evidence on the dynamics of such repositioning in the following regressions.
Recall that the most preferred locations of satellite currencies are distributed with respect Among the interest rate movements the recent dynamics in Japan's rate since 1995 stands out. It is a reflection of the heavy "yen carry trade"; we already described the carry trade phenomenon in footnote 9 in Section 2. The "yen carry trade" has reportedly been a fairly widespread strategy since the yen started its declining trend in the spring of 1995. Investors could borrow cheaply in the Japanese money market and invest the proceeds in a wide array of assets ranging from U.S. Treasuries to high-yielding emerging market securities. In fact, in 1996 and early 1997 high interest rates in East Asian money markets and stable dollar exchange rates attracted much of these funds. This strategy paid off as long as the yen did not appreciate and other East Asian currencies remained firmly pegged to the U.S. dollar. For more details as well as different trading strategies see Béranger et al. (1999) and Galati and Melvin (2004) . depend on its own lagged value as it is also irrelevant a to our model, but it reflects the lagged minimum and maximum interest rate changes.
2. The inter-period change of the minimum values ( min t r Δ ) reflects the lagged minimum and median interest rate changes. The result suggests that the minimum is moving in the same direction as the changes in median values as well as changes in the minimum itself. This is consistent with the model as for the minimum values the median is the closest relevant neighboring indicator of movements within the policy space. Since the minimum is a natura not expect any reaction with respect to a change aximum value; this is also confirmed empirically.
3. The inter-period change of maximum values ( max t r Δ ) chiefly reflects the lagged change in the maximum value since the maximum is an upper bound of the policy space that is theoretically infinite but an interest rate of infinity is ruled out in practice. The negative sign of the coefficient associated with the lagged maximum reflects adjustments related to limiting the extent of the policy space from above. Alternatively, the movement can be interpreted as a tendency to revert to the mean: the higher a change in maximum in the last period, the more it decreases in the subsequent period. Further, the change of maximum values depends on the lagged change in minimum values that illustrate how the lower band of the policy space moves with respect to the limit of the upper bound.
The two findings interpreted jointly reflect the situation in which the policy space 
Concluding remarks
30 China has kept its currency, the yuan, virtually fixed at 8.28 CNY/USD for the last twelve years. China's central bank adjusted the yuan's value to 8.11 CNY/USD on July 21, 2005 and announced that it would manage it by reference to a basket of the currencies of its main trading partners. The composition of the basket was revealed on August 10, 2005: it is dominated by the U.S. dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen and the South Korean won, and also contains the Australian, Canadian and Singapore dollars, the British pound, the Malaysian ringgit, the Russian rouble and the Thai baht. It is estimated (by Deutsche Bank) that the U.S. dollar is the largest component of the basket, with a 30 percent weight. The euro and yen likely take up 20 percent each and the won 10 percent. 31 This is in line with recent arguments made by McKinnon (2004) and Schnabl (2004). Further, Girardin (2005) shows that during rapid-growth episodes a group of East Asian countries that had strong links with Japan in the 1980s instead developed strong links with China in the 1990s. The fact that the 1990s and early 2000s was a very special period for the Japanese economy should be kept in mind, though. 32 When we extend the exposition one step further, our model offers an explanation for why Japan is not simply monetizing its debt. According to our model, if they did, one would expect them to lose pegged satellite currencies, which would decrease the extent of an informal currency area.
In this paper we build a spatial competition model in a two-stage game setup to assess whether stable coexistence, in the sense of a pure-strategy equilibrium, among the world's leading currencies is attainable. We conclude that a stable equilibrium among the existing anchor currencies is not likely to be achieved under existing monetary arrangements. We show that although a stable equilibrium can arise in the case of two anchor currencies, 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 9 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 0 199 1996 1998 2002 
, we get for the derivative from the left 
) and for s holds if if the preferred locations of the two anchor currency central banks are relatively close together but off the median of f. In other 33 In the following, we will ignore ε in the share and also in the costs because it can be arbitrarily small. x (as long a ε s is small enough such that the increase in location costs is negligible). This situation leads to the requirement 
. Thus the decrease in location costs is smaller than the loss in s and a deviation to x x < does not pay. Finally, a deviation to 
